The contribution of human factors to air safety
November 26, 2023 by Eric Bradley
This month, I've been a bit obsessed with the
topic of air safety. Well, why wouldn't I be?
Safety must always be our top priority. Data
pulled from the Aviation Safety Network for the
month of November shows there have been over 200
crashes, and that number doesn't include other
incidents such as near-misses. Statistics show
that an overwhelming majority of air accidents
occur as a result of what are known as "human
factors," and in my opinion, there is a critical
need for the aviation community to do whatever
it takes to find a way to reduce the number of
accidents occurring.
Human factors defined
So, just what are human factors anyway? This is
a blanket term used to describe any mishap that
can be attributed to reasons other than
structural faults, system malfunctions, or "Acts
of God." In other words, they are mishaps that
result from humans being human.
Human factors can be the sole contributor to an
accident, or they can occur simultaneously with
system malfunctions or structural faults. The
term can be applied to accidents caused by
pilots, mechanics, engineers, cabin crew, ground
crew, passengers, and any combination of these
options.
Even people who are far removed from the flight
deck such as airline managers can be a source
contributing to an accident in the air.
The point I hope to make here is that everyone
in the aviation community, including passengers,
has a role to play in helping to keep aviation
as safe as it possibly can be.
Other accident causes
Human factors are a leading cause of aviation
accidents, but there are many other potential
causes, so it is only fair to list some of them.
Other causes can include:
-
Structural problems
-
System malfunctions
-
Serious weather events
-
Natural disasters (eg. volcanic eruptions)
-
Unpredictable non-preventable events in
flight (eg. poison gas emission)
Some of these are very far-fetched and therefore
unlikely to occur often in reality. In fact,
accident causes usually overlap, giving rise to
the description of the "Swiss cheese model" of
accident causation developed by the aptly named
James Reason.
This model demonstrates that individual causes
are rare. Most of the time it is a combination
of many factors that lead to the ultimate
failure. In aviation investigations, we refer to
this as "the chain of events". If each event
occurring in the timeline is represented by a
block of cheese, then looking back we can see
how the holes align to create the disaster.
Ultimately we can often see that many accidents
can be traced back to a cause far from the
airport that has nothing to do with the cause
identified as the primary cause in the
investigation report.
For example, in the fatal crash of AA965, pilot
error was found as the primary cause, however
while this played a prominent role in the
outcome, unraveling the chain of events reveals
that the originating cause was sabotage
of the Cali ground radar station by FARC forces.
Despite this being the originating cause
(which means the crash is unlikely to have
occurred at all if the approach radar had been
functioning correctly), it is barely given a
mention in the investigation report.
If you have never been to Cali, it may not be
obvious why a functioning approach control radar
is so important. This is a radar system used at
TRACON centers to help to identify and locate
aircraft as they approach and depart from
airport terminal areas.
When there is no radar present or when it is not
functioning, the controller has no way to
visually confirm the location of an aircraft.
Even worse, although not relevant to this case,
the controller has no warning of potential
separation conflicts (something that happens
when aircraft are flying too close to each
other). Alternative methods are employed to try
and keep aircraft separated effectively, but
this situation is far from ideal or even
reliable.
Cali, like many other South American cities, is
located in a wide valley between two very steep
mountain ranges. This type of terrain can create
unique weather phenomena, which adds to the
potential problems for pilots and controllers.
Personally, I feel that traffic should have been
diverted away from Cali until the damaged radar
had been fixed. This would have been the "safety
first" approach, however there are several
reasons why authorities would have chosen not to
do so:
-
It was Christmas time.
-
The most convenient alternative airport was
at MedellĂn, 400km (249 miles) away, a
journey of several hours by road.
-
Pilots, passengers, and locals would have
been severely inconvenienced by a diversion.
So, while I believe diverting the airplane could
have been enough entirely on its own to prevent
the tragedy from occurring, there were
legitimate reasons for why this was not done.
Indeed, once the plane was suspected to have
crashed, the authorities reportedly gave out a story
to those waiting at the airport that the plane
was circling above the airport
because they had closed it.
With the originating cause secreted away, the other contributing factors
must come under scrutiny. And it is here that investigators unanimously
came to the conclusion that human factors were a primary causative
reason for the crash.
How human factors create risk
Humans, for all their wondrous achievements,
are still incredibly vulnerable creatures.
Driven by a combination of hormones and sheer
will, they can be weakened by fatigue, hunger,
thirst, injury, illness, medications, and
illicit substances.
Any of these conditions being present can cause
the incredible human machine to malfunction.
When multiple conditions are present
simultaneously, serious errors can result.
As mentioned earlier, everyone connected to the
aviation industry, including passengers, is
subject to human factors. But those with the
most responsbibility are pilots.
As a pilot, you need to be as aware of your own
internal state as you are of what's happening
inside and outside the cockpit.
The most important time to perform this self
evaluation is just before flying. but you should
also make it a habit to check your internal
state at regular intervals during the flight as
well.
Another task that should not be neglected is to
establish good CRM. If possible, developing a
rapport with your fellow pilot and other crew
members will also contribute to a positive
environment within the cockpit.
What gives the tragic fate of AA965 an extra
edge is that both pilots were very experienced
and well-trained. They should have been aware
of the human factors that were influencing their
bad decisions and should have taken corrective
actions when they became aware that they were
not functioning optimally.
One thing that has become apparent to me as an
instructor is that when an inexperienced student
is at the controls of an airplane, they will be
paying keen attention to everything and will try
to do everything "by the book."
It is when pilots have more experience that they
can start to become complacent. With that in
mind, let's take a look at the chain of events
affecting AA965 from a human factors perspective
and see if these factors could have been
mitigated. For the sake of brevity, we will
ignore factors that don't apply to the
situation.
ACTUAL CHAIN OF (RELEVANT) EVENTS
With this timeline established, we now can make
an analysis of the human factors impacting the
flight crew and determine how these factors could
have been mitigated.
-
Sabotage: if the FARC guerillas had
not disabled the radar, the controller would
have noticed the aircraft was not in the
position reported by the pilots and could
have attempted to warn them.
-
Taking the path of least resistance: There is a tendency in
aviation management, which has spread to other authorities, to
prioritize passenger convenience over safety. This unfortunate tendency
has been a factor in many crashes. Instead of closing the airport
to inbound traffic, which was an option (in my opinion, the only
appropriate option), authorities chose to remain open in order to cause
the least amount of disruption to anybody. To be fair, only one plane
crashed that night. But perhaps that was one too many.
-
Language: the controller later stated that he wanted to warn the
crew that the plan to fly direct to Rozo did not make any sense, but
that his English language skills were not sufficient to explain why.
Furthermore, the Captain of AA965 exhibited poor use of Aviation English
when he checked in with "American 965, leaving Flight Level two four
zero, descending to two zero zero." This is non-standard phraseology
similar to the error that had caused a fatal crash in Malaysia just
7 years earlier. While this slip didn't play a role in the crash of
AA965, it was an unacceptable lapse of radio discipline when
communicating in Aviation English with a non-native English speaker.
-
Temporal anxiety: the flight left from Miami 2 hours late. This
was a catalyst for creating severe anxiety in the Captain of the flight
because of his concerns about the legal problems it would create for
the crew. FAA rules require all crew members to take mandatory 10 hour
breaks if the total number of flight hours within 24 hours exceeds 8
hours. There are also weekly, monthly, and annual limits on the number
of hours that can be flown. The Captain's concern was that any
additional delay in the aircraft's arrival time in Cali ran the risk of
pushing the crew over the flight duty hour limit, and thus would prevent
them from being able to return to Miami on the next flight. This appears
to have induced a state of "get there itis" in the Captain, causing him
to prioritize the arrival time.
-
Poorly executed CRM: on multiple occasions, the crew exhibited
technical errors in Crew Resource Management (CRM) procedure, including
the Captain's fateful incorrect data input. If the pilots had been
monitoring the CDU and EHSI as they were supposed to do, the error that
caused the plane to go off course would have been noticed and corrected.
-
Inattention / willful ignorance: on more than one occasion, the
Captain gave incorrect readbacks to communications from the controller,
and keyed in a direct approach to Cali when ordered to proceed via
Tulua. When reminded of the importance of reporting in after crossing
Tulua, the Captain failed to check and update the FMS, leaving it set
direct to Cali.
-
Poor planning: during the later stages of the flight, the pilots
exhibited a lack of familiarity with the planned route, and gave clear
indications of not knowing key information from the approach chart for
the Rozo One arrival. As the flight was delayed for 2 hours before
taking off, there was plenty of time to study the route and prepare
properly for the flight.
-
Inability to recognize and accept fault: once it became evident
that the pilots were lost, they indicated a lack of faith in the
navigational data displayed to them by the instruments and avionics,
spending precious moments willing the waypoints to be where the pilots
expected the waypoints to be. When they finally conceded and entered
the correct code for ULQ, they still did not take the correct action.
This would have been to retract the flaps and speed brake, accelerate
and climb to the previously assigned altitude, and recommence the Rozo
One approach from Tulua (ULQ). Instead they continued to decelerate and
descend as they had forgotten to fly the plane.
-
Memory lapse under stress: the First Officer forgot the speed
brake was deployed, and even after the first stall warning, neither
pilot checked the speed brake or attempted to retract it. This led to a
second and fatal stall.
-
Over-reliance on automation: both pilots trusted the FMS to guide
them safely to their destination, and so did not perform the proper
checks, apparently unaware that the FMS is just a computer that will
unemotionally execute any order, even when the order is illogical and
potentially dangerous.
-
Over-reliance on Captain's experience: the report authors also
decided that the First Officer had too much faith in the Captain's
experience flying into Cali, and so had "relaxed vigilance" during the
flight.
-
Lack of situational awareness: the pilots failed to respond to
every indication of being lost and remained ignorant of this until
almost the last moment. They also apparently had no idea of having
crossed the mountain range, and did not know their proximity to terrain
until the GPWS activated.
Concluding remarks
In the dynamic landscape of aviation safety, we've witnessed commendable
advances over the decades, particularly in recognizing the importance of
CRM training and Human Factors education. Despite these advancements, the
aviation community still faces a critical challenge: the stability in the
number of air crashes over the past decade, predominantly attributed to
Human Factors. The expectation is that safety should improve as knowledge
expands, but with crash numbers remaining stable, it is a disappointing
result.
This is not a call for despair but an opportunity for improvement. We've
come a long way, and we can go further! As you embark on your flights,
remain vigilant to the Human Factors influencing both you and your crew.
Remember that air traffic controllers are human too, susceptible to errors.
Communicate with politeness and accuracy, and don't hesitate to address
potential mistakes.
Plan each flight meticulously, committing critical information about your
route to memory. Maintain unwavering situational awareness throughout the
journey. Most importantly, cherish and enjoy the flight. Your mood is not
just a personal experience but a key factor in ensuring a safe and
successful flight.
Let's build on our achievements, learn from our experiences, and
collectively contribute to a safer future in aviation.